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Abstract 
New Zealand offers a through-provoking case study of the effects of different competition 
and regulatory policies on broadband diffusion rates.  Despite having one of the highest rates 
of Internet connection and usage in the OECD, widely available broadband infrastructure and 
low prices, broadband uptake per capita languishes in the bottom third of the OECD.  Whilst 
low uptake has typically been attributed to competition and regulatory factors associated with 
New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime, this chapter proposes that the most likely 
reason is a combination of legacy demand-side regulations, in particular the tariff options for 
voice telephony, and limited value being derived by residential consumers from the small 
range of applications currently necessitating broadband connections.  The New Zealand case 
illustrates the effect that legacy regulations can have on the diffusion of new technologies, 
and indicates a need for more research on the effect of telecommunications industry 
regulations on demand-side uptake factors.  
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Introduction 
Despite being one of the leading countries in the adoption1 and use of Internet access, and 
having (1) a sophisticated e-commerce infrastructure and internationally high numbers of e-
commerce transactions per capita, (2) a population regarded as avid early adopters and users 
of applications such as electronic funds transfer and electronic commerce, (3) widespread and 
early deployment of a variety of high-speed broadband technologies and (4) internationally 
low prices for broadband products, New Zealand’s broadband uptake per capita has been 
consistently in the lower third of the OECD2 (Table 1).   The simplistic explanation typically 
offered for low broadband uptake has been New Zealand’s telecommunications competition 
and regulatory framework3.     
 
In an industry where sector-specific regulation, and local loop unbundling (LLU) in 
particular, have been strongly advocated and widely adopted internationally4 with the specific 
objective of accelerating broadband uptake rates5, New Zealand has stood apart from most of 
its OECD counterparts.  Principal differences are its reliance upon competition law and 
minimal regulation to shape participants’ actions6 and its reluctance to impose competitive 
access obligations on its solitary privately-owned national fixed line network operator7.   In 
the absence of detailed market analyses, ‘competition problems’ attributed to the different 
                                                     
1 At September 2005, 76.3% of the New Zealand population had access to the Internet (ITU).     
2 Details of New Zealand’s relative performance in Internet and e-commerce metrics across time are contained in Boles de Boer, 
Evans and Howell (2000), Howell and Marriott (2001) and Howell, Mishra and Ryan (2004).  Broadband investment history, 
diffusion and utilisation is documented in Howell and Obren (2002, 2003), and Howell (2003, 2006).  Comparative international 
pricing analyses are in Howell (2003) and Wear and Duncan (2005) and Network Strategies (2006).  Table 1 provides a 
summary. 
3 Ministry of Economic Development (2006).   
4 The OECD has advocated since 2001 that, in the absence of competition between different technological platforms, local loop 
unbundling may play a significant role in facilitating the development of competition for former monopoly incumbent 
telecommunications providers (OECD, 2001).   At October 2006, Mexico remained the only OECD nation not to have mandated 
some form of local loop unbundling. 
5 Local loop unbundling was mandated by the European Union in Regulation 2887/2000/EC in order to boost competition in the 
provision of broadband (Official Journal L 336, pp 4-8, 30.12.2000 as cited by Sutherland, 2006.  New Zealand mandated 
bitstream unbundling in 2004 and legislation for full LLU is pending.  Full LLU is proposed to address low levels of broadband 
uptake (MED, 2006).   
6 Between 1990 and 2001, the solitary industry-specific ‘regulations’ covering the NZ telecommunications sector related to the 
‘Kiwi Share’ retained by the New Zealand government following the privatization of the formerly state-owned network operator, 
Telecom New Zealand Ltd.  The ‘Kiwi Share’ capped residential line rentals at the price charged at the date of privatization 
(taking into account consumer price index (CPI) changes), a universal service obligation equalizing line rental charges for rural 
and urban users, and an obligation to make available a ‘flat rate’ tariff option to all residential consumers.  Following 
reintroduction of sector-specific regulation in 2001, the costs of the universal service obligation became shared amongst all 
network operators.  A Telecommunications Service Obligation (TSO) payment is levied annually (retrospectively) by the 
Telecommunications Commissioner.  Despite the ability to raise residential line rental charges in accordance with the CPI, 
Telecom has very rarely altered prices, resulting in decreases in the real price of residential access across the 1990s that have 
been greater than the OECD average (Howell and Obren, 2003).  The popularity of the flat rate residential tariff, which was the 
only tariff option offered under state ownership, is evidenced by the fact that fewer than 10% of residential consumers chose the 
two-part ‘Economy’ tariff offered by Telecom at any time when it was available between 1997 and 2004.  This tariff option has 
now been withdrawn.  Wear and Duncan (2005) show that, as a consequence of the popularity of the flat rate tariff, calling 
minutes per residential account in New Zealand are substantially higher than in comparator OECD countries where local calls are 
metered per minute.   
7 Boles de Boer and Evans (1996).   
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regulatory approach have become convenient scapegoats upon which to lay the blame8 for the 
New Zealand broadband uptake ‘problem’9.   
 
The credibility of the ‘competition problem/regulatory differences’ explanation for low 
broadband uptake begins to fail, however, when juxtaposed against New Zealand’s OECD 
leadership in virtually every other indicator associated with uptake and utilisation of the 
Internet.  The same competitive and regulatory framework applying during the rollout of 
broadband infrastructures appears not to have impeded investment in, or uptake and 
utilisation of, all other non-broadband Internet-related infrastructures and applications.  
Neither does it appear to have impeded investment in or internationally competitive pricing 
of, broadband services10.  The primary characteristics that competitive markets are presumed 
to deliver, and are the primary objectives of regulatory intervention – low prices, timely 
introduction of new services and higher product qualities, and universal service/access11 - 
have already been achieved.  The additional benefits that are typically expected from 
increased competitive intensity - greater provider variety and consequent marginal 
improvements in service quality – do not appear to be sufficient to account for the substantial 
differences in broadband diffusion per capita between New Zealand and countries with 
smaller Internet-using populations, higher absolute prices for broadband access and less 
widely-available infrastructures.   
 
The New Zealand case study begs the question of the role of specific regulatory interventions 
in determining the broadband diffusion rate.   Firstly, how has New Zealand been able to 
achieve supply-side conditions in the provision of broadband access that have yet to be 
achieved by the majority of countries employing extensive regulatory intervention in fixed 
                                                     
8 See, for example, Network Strategies (2006).   
9 Attribution of ‘broadband uptake problems’ to differences in competitive and regulatory regimes has also occurred in the 
United States – e.g. Hausman, Sidak and Singer (2001), Ferguson (2002), Hausman (2002), Shelanski (2002), Wallsten (2006) 
and Sacher and Wallsten (2006).  
10 New Zealand was amongst the first OECD nations to complete digitisation of the telephone network (1994).  New Zealand was 
third in the OECD (after the United States and Canada) to offer a commercial ADSL product (January, 1999).  By 2003, it was 
available to 85% of fixed line customers.  In 2006, it is available to 94% of fixed line customers.  The initial speed offered 
(2Mbps) was one of the highest in the OECD.  In 2001 was the third lowest-priced product (megabyte per second downloaded) in 
the OECD (Howell, 2003).  Whilst it has been suggested that data caps are depressing uptake (e.g. Network Strategies, 2006), 
caps arise as a consequence of the high volumes of data transmitted from offshore, which must pass through the monopoly 
Southern Cross trans-Pacific oceanic cable (Howell, 2006).  For monthly usage packages of 10Gb and less, comparing products 
of comparable speed, New Zealand prices are still substantially lower than those of most other OECD countries.  In 2004, New 
Zealand’s incumbent 10Gb/month package (i.e. comparable in extent of coverage and availability) was between 9% and 30% 
lower than the equivalent products offered in all of the OECD top quartile uptake countries (Howell, 2006a, based upon data in 
Network Strategies, 2006).  Iceland, despite the presence of much more severe data caps on international traffic (100Mb per 
month, compared to 10,000Mb per month in the most generous NZ capped package), has consistently been amongst the top 
OECD performers in broadband connections per capita.   
11Although substantial choice of service provider and some aspects of service quality might not have been achieved, these must 
be assessed against the fact that New Zealand has a small population (4.1 million), low population density (14.6 persons per 
square kilometer), widely geographically-dispersed pattern of urbanization, with only one city having a population of more than 
500,000 and is geographically isolated.  New Zealand markets typically lack advantages from economies of scale, exhibit 
substantially higher concentration levels than comparator countries, and have relatively higher levels of capital intensity than 
comparator countries (Arnold, Boles de Boer and Evans, 2003).   
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line access markets (that is, various forms of local loop unbundling), despite its reliance upon 
a privately-owned network provider with substantial market power and only competition law 
and a handful of very light-handed regulations (and in particular, an absence of LLU) with 
which to shape participants’ interactions?  Secondly, even if regulatory intervention is 
necessary to ensure the provision of widely-available, low-priced broadband Internet access, 
does it necessarily follow that a population of high-using, widely experienced Internet users 
will automatically substitute away from their existing access technologies to broadband 
connections?   
 
This chapter addresses these questions.  Whilst supply side factors make the purchase of a 
technology possible, broadband diffusion rates measure the demand side response to its 
availability. The apparent absence of supply-side impediments in the New Zealand market 
suggests that an explanation for slower diffusion may lie in demand-side factors.  The 
apparent reluctance of experienced Internet users to buy broadband connections suggests a 
demand-side reluctance to substitute from dial-up to broadband access, which regulators 
focused on supply-side factors are typically ill-equipped to identify.  This information 
asymmetry leads to risks of over-attribution of the effect of regulatory intervention on uptake 
statistics of embryonic technologies.  By holding supply-side factors constant, a demand-side 
model of broadband purchase and substitution can be developed, based on the utility derived 
by users from a defined set of Internet applications and differences in tariff structures, in 
order to provide a better understanding of the factors influencing the replacement of dial-up 
Internet access by broadband.  With such understandings, regulators will be better equipped to 
analyse the need for regulatory intervention, thereby raising the quality of regulatory 
intervention.  
 
When applied to the New Zealand case facts, the model suggests that demand-side tariff 
regulations pertaining to residential voice telephony (specifically flat-rate tariffs) have had a 
significant effect upon the development of the New Zealand market, leading to a bias towards 
purchase of dial-up Internet access.  That so few New Zealand Internet users have substituted 
to broadband suggests that, at the current point in time, the applications used most frequently 
by the majority of users do not require the speed and data volume capabilities of broadband, 
and dial-up remains the most cost-effective Internet access method.    This raises the question 
of whether it is appropriate for regulators to utilise any tools to influence embryonic 
technology diffusion patterns, given their sparse information about the demand-side 
characteristics, as well as raising the issue of the extent to which the effect that their 
regulations have already had on demand-side factors are being evidenced in existing 
broadband diffusion statistics.   
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 Regulation, Diffusion and the Regulatory Use of Diffusion Statistics 
As a starting point, it is presumed that the diffusion of any technology is the outcome of the 
interaction of supply-side and demand-side factors.  The presumption is that, in the absence of 
any impediments to bargaining, total welfare is maximised as a consequence of such 
interactions.  The quantity of units sold per capita (diffusion) under these circumstances is 
optimal.  However, impediments may result in either more or fewer than the welfare-
maximising quantity being sold.  The impediments may affect either the supply or the demand 
side of the market.  For example, supplier market power results in lower total welfare as the 
supplier constrains supply in order to sell units at higher prices.  Likewise, subsidies to 
consumers may result in the quantity demanded being higher than optimal, with total welfare 
reduced as a consequence of the welfare forfeited in other markets in order to create the 
subsidy being greater than the welfare accruing from higher purchases of the subsidised good 
or activity.   
 
Supply-Side Regulatory Intervention 
The argument typically offered to justify the regulation of telecommunications markets, and 
incumbent telecommunications operators in particular, is to constrain operators’ use of market 
power to maximise their profits by restricting the supply of services to consumers and 
charging prices above the point where welfare is maximised.   Regulatory intervention 
principally seeks to reduce these supply-side constraints (including the use of price controls), 
resulting in a focus upon the use of metrics indicating changes in uptake per capita in order to 
assess the performance of regulatory intervention in constraining supplier market power.    
 
Increases in uptake per capita are thus the principal demand-side indicators to regulators of 
increases in total welfare resulting from reductions in the exertion of supplier market power,  
inasmuch as it has been previously established that the supply side was in fact being 
constrained by suppliers’ actions.  The inference drawn is that regulatory intervention has 
been the driver of the ensuing welfare increase represented by increased uptake.  This is 
distinct from the welfare inferences that can be drawn from increases in uptake (i.e. the 
natural diffusion pattern) of a completely new technology.  An increase in uptake in this case 
signifies that the benefits of purchasing the technology exceed the costs for an increasing 
number of customers who are gradually choosing to purchase.  This may occur as the price 
reduces (e.g. as more suppliers enter the market or as a growing market leads to economies of 
scale and improved production processes, resulting in lower costs passed on to consumers as 
lower prices), as new applications utilising the technology are developed, thereby increasing 
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the size of the potential market, or as more potential customers become informed about the 
benefits that the technology offers them, relative to other calls on their budgets.   
 
Risks From Demand-Side Information Asymmetries 
Melody (2005) notes that the current body of regulatory knowledge has been accumulated 
principally from regulating suppliers whose exertion of market power is well-established, and 
where it is has been established that there is a pent-up demand for products and services that 
is not being met specifically because of supplier actions.  Hence, in the conduct of regulatory 
activities focusing upon constraining these supply-side powers, “attention to demand is not a 
priority” (p 28).  The consequence is an approach to market development “fostered by the 
fascination of many old and new operators with the technical capabilities of new 
technologies” and a prevailing view that “if we build it, they (consumers) will come”, at the 
expense of understanding the role of the demand side factors in the diffusion of technologies 
supplied by the regulated providers.   
 
Thus, when new technologies are diffusing in industries that have been regulated because of 
the presence of historic supply-side market power, a risk exists that uptake increases arising 
from the natural patterns of a new technology offered by the regulated providers diffusing 
may be inappropriately attributed to supply-side regulatory interventions, simply because 
there is insufficient understanding of the relevant demand-side factors that are simultaneously 
contributing to the observed diffusion pattern.  Likewise, it may be inappropriately assumed 
that diffusion rates can be accelerated with supply-side interventions at very early stages of 
the new technology’s diffusion, simply because the same interventions have been 
instrumental in raising uptake, and therefore welfare, in more mature product markets.  Such 
approaches risk distorting the normal competitive interactions that occur in the early stages of 
any new technology, where there are substantial uncertainties for both suppliers and 
consumers about the short and long-term merits and uses of the technology.   
 
The diffusion of Internet access in the historically highly-regulated telecommunications 
industry provides an example where the risks of distortions arising from regulatory 
intervention are significant.  Existing regulatory measures will affect diffusion patterns, with 
differences in initial conditions and regulations necessarily contributing to differences in 
patterns between countries being observed. Melody (2005) further notes that “typically, both 
regulatory rules and tariff restrictions prevent experimentation and add to the risks of 
innovation, particularly by intermediaries and end-users on the demand side of market 
development” (p 33).  In order to determine whether regulatory, supply- or demand-side 
factors are responsible for observed differences, to assess the likely efficacy of any regulatory 
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intervention and to improve regulatory quality, an understanding of existing demand-side 
factors and their contribution to diffusion patterns is essential.   
 
A Demand-Side Model of Broadband Uptake 
In the case of Internet access technologies, demand is derived from the benefits that 
consumers accrue from the applications utilising Internet access (Crawford, 1997).  As with 
all telecommunications technologies, Internet demand generates a requirement for both access 
and usage (data transmission) (Laffont and Tirole, 2002).  Dial-up and broadband diffusion 
statistics measured as connections per capita are capturing only the component that relates to 
Internet access.  When making a decision about whether to purchase a connection, and which 
connection type to purchase, a user must consider the effect of both access and usage charges 
required to derive benefits from a defined set of applications.  Whilst all Internet users must 
pay an access charge, users of applications generating large amounts of data traffic will incur 
greater usage charges than users of applications generating lower amounts of data transfer.  
The user will purchase an Internet connection only if the benefits from the applications 
exceed the sum of access and usage charges (Wenders, 1990), plus other incidental costs.   
 
If it is presumed that broadband technologies are the frontier of Internet access, and dial-up 
technologies the vintage, then users will substitute when the additional benefits of using the 
frontier technology exceed the additional costs for the defined set of applications.  The 
frontier technology is said to be dominant when all new users purchase it, but only 
conditionally dominant when some new users choose to purchase the vintage technology, 
despite the frontier being available (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1996).  The specific benefits 
that broadband access confers are savings in time (due to faster data transfer) and the ability 
to use applications that are physically impossible to use on dial-up.  Thus, the user will 
substitute if the benefits of broadband are greater than the additional costs to support use of 
the existing application base, or if the benefits from additional applications that can only be 
utilised with broadband access exceed any additional costs that their usage incurs (as per 
Boyan and Jovanovic, 2000) 12.   
 
Purchase and Substitution 
The purchase and substitution decision can be modelled thus13. Assume an Internet customer 
 uses a set of i },...3,2,1{ nj = applications each requiring jυ  megabytes of bandwidth to 
                                                     
12 Network effects that accrue from having more individuals connected to the Internet network, irrespective of connection type) 
are included in this benefit.   
13 The form of the model derives from Wenders (1990). 
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generate a benefit (net of all costs other than those associated with information transfer) of 
. The benefit can be generated using either a broadband or a dial-up Internet 
connection.   Fixed costs are  for dial-up access and  for broadband, (e.g. equipment, 
telephone line, DSL line, cable subscription, ISP subscription).  Assuming that dial-up access 
is metered per minute connected and broadband per megabyte transferred, variable costs are 
 per minute for dial-up access (including both telephone and ISP time-based charges), and 
 per megabyte transferred for broadband.  The user’s time taken to transfer information for 
application j is  minutes using dial-up and  minutes using broadband ( ).  
The user has a value of time 
ij
n
j β1=Σ
DF BF
DV
BV
DjT BjT 0>> BjDj TT
iγ  per minute.   
 
The user can choose to purchase no connection, a dial-up connection or a broadband 
connection, depending upon which option renders the highest utility , measured as 
benefits less costs.  A connection will be purchased only if 
KiΠ
BDKKi ,,0 =>Π .  If all other 
user costs are independent of the information transfer method, then the user’s net utility from 
Internet use will be: 
 ( )( ) DDjDiijnjDi FTV −+−Σ=Π = γβ1   using dial-up   (1) 
and 
   using broadband.  (2) BjBBjiij
n
jBi FVT −−−Σ=Π = )(1 υγβ
 
Users will continue to add applications to their portfolios, and increase the usage of existing 
applications (incurring additional costs in minutes of time and data transfer consumption), as 
long as the additional benefits exceed the additional costs.  Dial-up access will be purchased 
where  and broadband where 0>Π>Π BiDi 0>Π>Π DiBi .  Substitution of dial-up with 
broadband will occur when >BiΠ DiΠ . If one application j=n cannot physically operate 
using dial-up, then broadband will be purchased only if exceeds  
. 
BiΠ
( )( ) DDjDiijnjDi FTV −+−Σ=Π −= γβ11
 
Broadband will be preferred to dial-up when 
 ( ) 0)()( 11 >−Σ+−Σ+− == jBDjDnjBjDjnjiBD VTVTTFF υγ .   (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows that broadband substitution will be more likely to occur if the fixed costs 
for dial-up are large relative to the fixed cost of broadband, the value of time for the user is 
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high (and/or broadband is significantly faster than dial-up – connection speed is implicitly 
captured in the user value of time), or the volume of information transfers is large.  It is less 
likely to occur if the per-megabyte charge is large relative to the per-minute charge, the value 
of user time is low, or the relative speed difference is small.  
 
If broadband was truly a dominant technology, the applications predominantly used were 
feasible only on broadband, or if time is valued highly and the time savings from broadband 
use are large because data transfer volumes are large, then broadband would quickly dominate 
dial-up access.  However, empirical data does not appear to support this contention.  New 
dial-up connections continue to be sold to new Internet users in the United States (Horrigan, 
2006), New Zealand (Howell, 2006) and Europe (EU, 2006).  Different user time valuations, 
however, may lead to conditional dominance of broadband, at least for some user classes.  
Different time valuations plausibly account for observations of a greater likelihood of higher 
income users (presumed to have higher valuations of time) purchasing broadband connections 
than lower income users (Horrigan, 2006; Rappoport, Kridel and Taylor, 2002), even though 
in some surveys they appear to use the connection less frequently (Horrigan 2006 notes that 
higher income users spend less time per month on Internet activities than lower income 
users).  Low valuations of time and/or low data volumes are also consistent with experimental 
(Varian, 2002) and survey (Horrigan, 2006; EU, 2006; Point Topic, 2006) data suggesting 
that the majority of consumers are not prepared to pay large premiums for faster connections, 
given the current application base and usage patterns14.   
 
Together, these data suggest that the applications currently available and routinely used to 
generate benefits (apart from those supporting audio and video streaming and gaming) may 
not, as yet, necessitate the purchase of broadband connections for the majority of Internet 
users.  Rather, they suggest that broadband technology choice is largely determined by 
relative prices, especially at low usage volumes.  Technology choice may also be strongly 
influenced by tariff structures.  If historic regulatory intervention in the telecommunications 
market has resulted in pricing patterns that influence the relative connection and utilisation 
charges faced by customers, then in the absence of any other obvious supply-side distortions 
in the market, it cannot be discounted that these interventions are affecting the rate of 
diffusion of the broadband frontier access technology.   Of particular interest in respect of 
Internet access is the use of two-part and flat-rate tariffs.  
                                                     
14EU data in January 2006 indicate that only 19% if surveyed broadband users would be prepared to pay 10% more for faster 
connections and only 10% of users 20% more.  EU (2006) indicates 40% of EU dial up users, and Horrigan (2006) 50% of US 
dial-up users, are happy with existing dial-up speeds and have no plans to purchase broadband connections in the foreseeable 
future.  Point Topic (2006) indicates 82% of UK Internet households (both broadband and dial-up) are satisfied with download 
times.  
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 Flat-Rate Tariffs and the Demand-Side Substitution Model 
Flat-rate pricing tariffs influence users’ consumption levels by equalising the prices paid by 
both light and heavy users.  Whereas, in order to minimise total costs, a heavy user will 
typically favour a high fixed, low usage tariff and a low user a low fixed, high usage tariff, 
under flat rate tariffs both pay the same fee, irrespective of the level of usage (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2000).  Once a connection is purchased, the user faces no financial consequences of 
varying usage levels.  Light users consuming less than the average quantity subsidise heavy 
users consuming more than the average.  Flat rate tariffs enable heavy consumers, in 
particular, to use more of the product than they would had they faced a charge equal to the 
marginal cost of their usage.  Welfare is reduced relative to marginal cost pricing, as the 
additional costs incurred must be recovered either from all users in the form of higher a fixed 
fee15, or from another source.  
 
Flat-rate pricing regimes for Internet access are prevalent across the OECD.  Combined with 
an unmetered telephony component, they have been widely advocated as means of 
encouraging increases in both Internet access and use (OECD, 2000).   On the one hand, it is 
claimed they offer budget ‘insurance’ by eliminating the risk of users receiving unexpectedly 
large bills when unaware of the quantity of data transfer their use is generating, especially 
when using new Internet technologies where megabytes transferred per application may be 
opaque (Anania and Solomon, 1997; Brownlie, 1997)16.   On the other hand, as they facilitate 
‘costless’ (to the consumer) increases in usage, they are attributed with engendering the 
higher levels of both dial-up Internet uptake and usage observed first in countries where 
unmetered local telephony calling was the norm (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States – OECD, 2000; Howell, 2003).  Miravete (2003) suggests that, in respect of 
voice telephony plans at least, whilst consumers facing two-part tariffs may lack sufficient 
information to select the optimal plan initially, learning is rapid and they substitute quickly to 
a more cost-effective plan if the initial choice is non-optimal.  
 
Equations (1) to (3) can be modified to account for two types of flat rate tariffs.  When local 
telephony calls are unmetered (i.e. 0=DV ), equation (1) becomes 
                                                     
15 Fewer light users purchase a connection, and all users pay a higher fee, thereby lowering welfare relative to the counterfactual 
of the heaviest users consuming beyond the point where the benefits of their usage fall below marginal cost.   
16 Likewise, flat-rate plans obfuscate the fact that light users are consuming very small quantities of data transfer, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of light consumers transferring to a more cost-effective two-part tariff plan.  Despite the early popularity 
of flat-rate broadband packages, introduction of competition in broadband supply is resulting in more two-part tariffs being 
offered (‘product variety’), as predicted by Wenders (1990).  As suppliers gain more information about differences in customer 
usage patterns, they differentiate their offerings in order to maximise their share of surplus (whilst simultaneously increasing 
total surplus by reducing inefficient cross-subsidies from flat-rate tariffs).     
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( ) DDjiijnjDi FT −−Σ=Π = γβ1 .       (4) 
When broadband usage is unmetered (i.e. 0=BV ), equation (2) becomes 
BBjiij
n
jBi FT −−Σ=Π = )(1 γβ        (5) 
 
With no additional infrastructure usage charge incurred with increasing transaction volumes 
under flat-rate tariffs, uptake of new applications and additional use of existing applications 
incur only the cost of user time.  If new applications and transactions accrue a net benefit over 
the additional user time costs incurred, they will be adopted and used increasingly, 
irrespective of the infrastructure access method chosen.  The substitution choice becomes a 
simple trade-off between fixed costs, the value of user time, the number of applications used 
and the relative speed of the connections: 
       (6) 0)()( 1 >−Σ+− = BjDjnjiBD TTFF γ
 
Under flat-rate pricing of both access methods, broadband will be preferred if the fixed costs 
of dial-up are large relative to those of broadband, if broadband is significantly faster than 
dial-up, the value of time for the user is high, and the number of information exchanges is 
large.  Once the fixed prices and infrastructure speeds have been set by infrastructure 
providers, assuming users initially purchase the optimal technology for their volumes of 
usage, growth in the number of broadband connections is dependent solely upon increases in 
users’ valuation of time and/or the volume of information transfers.    
 
However, truly flat rate dial-up telephony charges as per equation (6) are uncommon17.  Even 
where unmetered calling has prevailed, connections to the Internet may incur a fixed charge 
per call (e.g. in Australia).  New Zealand has been one of the few countries where the 
regulatory-mandated local residential telephony calling tariff has resulted in users incurring 
no charge for either dial-up Internet connection or utilisation, although such tariffs are 
commonly offered voluntarily by providers in the United States (Miravete, 2003).    From 
equations (1), (4) and (5), it becomes clear why the substitution of broadband for dial-up 
connections has occurred at a substantially slower rate in New Zealand and the United States 
than in countries with metered dial-up telephony.    
 
When dial-up access is metered, but broadband unmetered, broadband is preferred when  
                                                     
17 With the exception of Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada, per minute charging has prevailed, although it is 
noted that some operators are now offering unmetered data calls on voice lines, even though voice calls are still metered (OECD, 
2005). 
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n
jDBjDj
n
ji FFTVTT −>Σ+−Σ ==γ .     (7) 
The smaller the difference between the fixed components of each technology’s access price, 
and the higher the usage price per metered dial-up minute, the greater the likelihood that 
broadband will be purchased for a given application base and transaction volume.  Unlike in 
equation (6), an increase in the volume of usage contributes directly to the technology trade-
off decision via an infrastructure usage charge for the vintage technology (dial-up) which is 
not incurred for the frontier (broadband).   
 
Thus, all other factors being equal, where transaction volumes are increasing (that is, where 
new applications and uses are continuing to be developed and users are continuing to adopt 
them) substitution between the vintage and the frontier will occur more rapidly when there is 
a metered usage price for the vintage technology.  Conversely, where there is no usage charge 
for the vintage, current and future usage expectations contribute to the technology purchase 
decision only inasmuch as they are influenced by the user’s valuation of time.  Increases in 
usage must be greater to justify the decision to substitute, simply because there is no 
infrastructure usage cost incurred as a result of increasing transaction activity.  Thus, both 
initial purchases of, and substitution to, the frontier, will be less than if a vintage 
infrastructure usage charge is present.   
 
Implications 
The demand-side model illustrates the weakness of relying upon uptake statistics alone in 
isolation from utilisation statistics when assessing the effects of regulatory intervention on 
markets.  Regulations influencing uptake and use of the vintage technology (in this case, dial-
up telephony) must be considered when interpreting uptake statistics for the frontier 
technology.  Whilst slow uptake of the frontier might indicate a market power abuse, it might 
equally be reflecting a regulatory distortion favouring continued use of the vintage 
technology.  Conversely, rapid uptake of the frontier might just as easily reflect demand side 
responses to pricing structures of the vintage technology as the consequence of regulatory 
interventions in the frontier technology’s supply side.    
 
Application to New Zealand 
As supply-side constraints appear unsatisfactory in explaining New Zealand’s low broadband 
uptake, the demand-side model offers a potential explanation.  Whilst multivariate regressions 
on countries suggest that low GDP per capita, low population density and uneven 
urbanisation patterns may contribute (Wallsten, 2006), regulatory factors contribute.  The 
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demand-side model suggests that the New Zealand data indicate that the benefits of 
broadband access for the vast majority of experienced Internet users do not, at present, justify 
the additional costs of substituting away from very low-priced dial-up access to very low-
priced broadband access18.   This may be because New Zealanders place very low valuations 
on their time, or do not, on the whole, place a high value on the applications that necessitate 
broadband connections (that is, audio and video streaming and gaming) relative to other calls 
on the residential budget (e.g. substitute applications)19.  Consistent with other countries such 
as Australia and the United States, where bandwidth used per consumer has been measured, 
the average bandwidth consumed per customer is low20, with a small proportion of consumers 
utilising a disproportionate share of available bandwidth.   
 
As New Zealand’s GDP per capita is relatively low (21st in the OECD), the individual 
valuation of time may play a role.  However, Howell (2003) finds that business uptake of 
broadband connections relative to other OECD countries is high, and consistent with all of the 
other Internet access and usage statistic rankings in the upper quartile.  This suggests that 
valuations of business time, at least, are not delaying broadband uptake noticeably compared 
to other countries.   As the number of households exceeds the number of businesses by a 
factor of around 8.6:1, national uptake statistics are dominated by residential user patterns.  
The evidence suggests that residential primarily uptake is responsible for the differences from 
other countries.  As flat-rate telephony tariffs have applied to residential telephony users, but 
not business users, the demand-side model of flat rate pricing of both infrastructures (equation 
6) appears to offer the most plausible explanation for the low levels of broadband uptake 
despite high levels of Internet uptake.  The differences between equation (6) and equation (7) 
appear to account for the lower levels of broadband uptake in New Zealand, as well as 
Australia and the United States21, relative to other countries where metered telephony usage 
has prevailed.   
 
                                                     
18 Table 2 shows the relative price of New Zealand broadband access to dial-up access, compared to a sample of other countries.    
19 Significantly, New Zealand currently has no IPTV services.  The sole digital pay television product is provided via satellite.  
Fibre-based cable television is available only in two localities, and has a very small market share.  ‘Triple play’ cable bundles 
offering video content simply resell wholesaled content from the satellite provider.  The incumbent telecommunications provider 
offers a pseudo ‘triple play’ bundle whereby television content is provided by the satellite company over its infrastructure, but 
with billing aggregated with voice and data services by the telco (Howell, 2006). 
20 Australian data shows residential broadband usage was 1.3Gb/month in the September quarter, 2003 (compared with 
1.5Gb/month in New Zealand in January 2003 – Howell, 2003) to 2.2 Gb/month in the March quarter, 2005.   
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/e8ae5488b598839cca25682000131612/6445f12663006b83ca256a150079564d!OpenD
ocument
21 Canada has a different set of local telephony characteristics, given the fact that access agreements were associated with 
geographic ‘de-averaging’ of prices, meaning the simple model cannot be applied directly to the Canadian market (OECD, 2003; 
Howell, 2006; Cave, 2006).    
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Strategic Interaction 
It is apposite to consider at this point the extent to which the flat-rate residential telephony 
tariff might have contributed towards the development of the supply side of New Zealand’s 
broadband market.  When the incumbent telecommunications provider was corporatised in 
the late 1980s and privatised in 1990, all legislative barriers to entry in the New Zealand 
telecommunications market were removed.  Whilst the incumbent faced no requirements to 
allow access to its infrastructures by other operators, it had no protections from competitive 
entry.  Under competition law, it faced the risk of legal action by competitors from exerting 
its market power.  As a former state-owned enterprise in a light-handed regulatory 
environment, it also faced a very real political risk that industry-specific regulation could be 
reintroduced at any time.  Thus, competitors and customers had access to two powerful 
mechanisms in addition to normal competitive and regulatory forces via which to constrain 
Telecom from acting in the manner typically associated with unregulated monopolies (Evans 
and Quigley, 2000).  The threat of such actions has undoubtedly shaped the strategic choices 
made by the company.   
 
In the absence LLU, new technology providers had no option of using Telecom’s 
infrastructure to offer broadband services.  Stand-alone infrastructures were required.  In the 
absence of specific entry barriers, these could be installed whenever commercially indicated.  
New Zealand’s first broadband provider, CityLink (Ethernet LAN), entered in 1995, followed 
by iHug (satellite) and Saturn Communications (fibre-optic cable) in 1998.  When Telecom 
offered ADSL in January 1999, it was the fourth entrant into the broadband market.  Whilst 
each of the competitors (apart from iHug) was confined to regional operation, competition 
from these alternative technologies provided significant competitive pressure on Telecom.    
iHug was initially the price leader (Howell and Obren, 2003).  As satellite broadband could 
potentially be offered nationwide, Telecom was required, right from the start, to offer its 
ADSL services throughout the country at one (universal) price.  To have adopted any other 
pricing strategy would have risked political action in response to accusations of strategic 
pricing22.  The risk of political and/or regulatory intervention was real and significant, given 
New Zealand’s long history of geographically-averaged telephony charging, consumer 
expectations and the ‘universal service’ obligations on Telecom as a consequence of the 
‘Kiwi Share’ (see footnote 6).   Thus, early investment in, and low universal pricing of, 
broadband by Telecom are in part explained by competitive entry and threat of legal and 
regulatory action. 
 
                                                     
22 When Saturn offered lower-priced telephony services over its fibre connections, and Telecom moved to match them in the 
region covered by Saturn, this is precisely what occurred.  
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However, competitive entry and legal and regulatory threats alone were not been the only 
forces acting on Telecom.  These forces have interacted with another key factor – mandatory 
unmetered local residential telephony tariffs.  Flat-rate residential tariffs have prevailed from 
the earliest days of state-owned telephony provision in New Zealand, and were included in 
the Kiwi Share as a point of political pragmatism in order to minimise consumer (and voter) 
dissent when Telecom was privatised in 1990.  Whilst designed to address voice telephony 
pricing, unmetered local calling provided real benefits to residential consumers with the 
advent of Internet access.   As illustrated in equation (4), unmetered tariffs place few 
restrictions on increases in consumer usage.  Howell and Obren (2003) show that between 
1996 and 2003, traffic minutes on the fixed network trebled as a consequence of new dial-up 
data traffic (by contrast, dial-up Internet traffic resulted in less than double the traffic passing 
over British Telecom’s voice networks over the same period).  Whilst the ‘Kiwi Share’ 
regulatory arrangements allowed for Telecom to increase residential line rentals annually in 
line with the CPI, partly because of the real risks of political intervention arising from 
consumer dissatisfaction, line rentals were adjusted only once between 1990 and 2003.  
Consequently, Telecom was forced to bear practically all of the costs of additional use of the 
network for residential dial-up Internet access.  The costs to Telecom of this were substantial, 
given that New Zealand dial-up Internet users were on average amongst the heaviest in the 
OECD (35 hours per month on average for 850,000 residential users – Howell and Obren, 
2003).   
 
The substantial cost to Telecom of ‘free’ (to the user) residential dial-up usage most likely 
provided the strongest strategic justification for the firm to invest early, rapidly and widely in 
broadband infrastructure.  The sooner high-consuming residential Internet users could be 
migrated from dial-up use, which could not be charged, to broadband, the use of which would 
generate additional income (in either or both of access and usage fees), the sooner the 
substantial losses arising from the huge volume of dial-up Internet usage could be stemmed.   
Thus, a high-quality ADSL product was introduced (2Mbps, when the entry level residential 
offering in most other OECD countries was 256kbps) early (January 1999, 3rd in the OECD), 
roll-out around the country was rapid (80% of telephony customers were connected to ADSL-
capable exchanges by 2002, 94% by 2005) and prices were set low to encourage early 
substitution.  A range of two-part tariffs were offered, providing incentives for light users to 
substitute to broadband without having to subsidise heavy users.  Heavy users, however, paid 
a lower per megabyte usage charge.  All users were required to pay usage charges (albeit via 
‘bundles’ of downloading capacity), in part reflecting the fact that over 95% of data 
consumed came from offshore, via the monopoly Southern Cross cable.  All providers, 
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including those with their own infrastructures, were required to charge in this manner as all 
are required to utilise the monopoly Southern Cross cable23.     
 
Answers and Implications 
The interaction of regulation in the form of flat-rate residential telephony charging, threat of 
regulation and legal action in a lightly-regulated market governed predominantly by 
competition law, and demand-side factors in the form of a rational user response to the costs 
and benefits of Internet use thus appear to provide the most plausible explanation for the New 
Zealand observations.  In answer to the first question posed in the introduction, regulatory 
factors are implicated, but it is the combination and interaction of a set of factors, including 
retail tariff obligations and universal service obligations, that have led to New Zealand 
achieving supply-side conditions in the provision of broadband access that have yet to be 
achieved by the majority of countries employing extensive fixed line regulatory interventions.  
Importantly, the case study illustrates that competition is a dynamic, interactive process 
involving suppliers, consumers, regulators and legislators, and that there are many ways in 
which desired supply-side outcomes can be achieved without necessarily having many firms 
in a market, or without recourse to LLU.  
 
Whilst some of the circumstances in the case study may be unique to New Zealand, a key 
finding is the significant effect that regulations relating to a legacy vintage technology can 
have on the supply conditions of a frontier technology.  It is impossible to assess the efficacy 
of any regulatory intervention without taking into account both supply and demand factors as 
they relate to both technologies.  Moreover, it is negligent to ignore the effect of regulations 
on the demand side of the market (as price caps, universal service obligations and retail tariff 
requirements are) upon the measures of regulatory performance, simply because they were 
not considered significant in the past.  The risk this invokes is that new regulations may be 
imposed on the suppliers of the frontier technology that are both unjustified, and most likely 
impotent in addressing the factors associated with the vintage technology that are the real 
causes underlying the observed outcomes.   
 
In answer to the second question, the demand-side model and the New Zealand case study 
illustrate that, in the absence of supply-side constraints, it is not at all clear that experienced 
Internet users will adopt broadband simply because it exists.  There is no reason to presume 
that the decision to purchase broadband is any different from that governing any other product 
                                                     
23 Most opted to charge different rates for national and international traffic, reflecting the cost differences.    
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or service with derived demand (e.g. physical transport).  Consumer purchase is determined 
by increases in utility, relative to other options.  If the benefits of the frontier are not large, 
then relative prices are pivotal.  The New Zealand data suggest that the utility of broadband is 
possibly much lower relative to dial-up, than may have been presumed by regulators, possibly 
due to a shortage of applications for which broadband is necessary.  It may be that the 
historical emphasis on technological capabilities and the focus on supplier factors have 
created an over-reliance upon assessments of user requirements by vested supplier interests, at 
the expense of genuinely consumer-determined assessments.  With regulatory effort focused 
on infrastructure providers in markets where wholesale and access customers have become 
the primary ‘users’ of a regulated telecommunications company’s services, the usage of 
residential consumers, in particular, may be more easily overlooked by regulators.   The risk 
is that, in the spirit of ‘build it and users will come’, supply may outpace demand, especially 
in the case of new technologies where it may take time for consumers to develop applications 
using its capacity, with uninformed regulators incorrectly interpreting the lack of consumer 
uptake as evidence of supply-side ‘problems’ justifying further regulatory intervention.   
 
A further danger emanating from the lack of demand-side understanding is that uninformed 
and unjustified regulatory intervention may determine the technology that ‘wins’ the majority 
of the market, thereby leading to increased pressure on legislators and regulators from 
incumbent and new entrant suppliers.  As the New Zealand case study illustrates, flat-rate 
telephony pricing has resulted in dial-up Internet access ‘winning’ the market share battle, at 
least given current applications.   The rate of substitution to broadband will be accelerated if 
this tariff option is replaced with metered dial-up tariffs.  But is such a regulatory change 
warranted?  As with all other regulatory interventions, the final arbiter must be total welfare.  
If it is cheaper for a network provider to carry the same traffic on broadband than dial-up 
networks, then welfare is higher if substitution occurs.  Without tariff restrictions, network 
providers would voluntarily change the tariff structure in order to accelerate substitution.  
Mandatory tariff regulations preventing suppliers from making these adjustments may allow 
inefficient over-consumption on the vintage technology to continue for longer than would 
have been the case absent the regulations.  It is possible that this is the welfare outcome in 
New Zealand, if broadband data transfer really is cheaper per megabyte than dial-up.  The 
lesson from this chapter is that mandatory flat rate tariffs for current broadband technologies 
may in the future impede the rate of substitution to the frontier technology that supersedes the 
current frontier.  Likewise, flat rate calling tariffs (occurring within usage ‘bundles’) may 
impede the substitution 3G mobile handsets for 2G handsets among some user groups.   
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Conclusion 
The New Zealand case study illustrates that regulatory interventions have interacted with 
other factors to have significant effects on the supply-side market conditions and broadband 
diffusion rate.  The New Zealand data call into question the extent to which supply side 
factors and regulatory intervention in other countries can explain differences in broadband 
uptake rates.  Demand side factors, and in particular, regulations affecting demand-side 
behaviour, such as flat-rate tariffs, price caps and universal service obligations, may also be 
instrumental.   Further analysis such as that undertaken in this chapter will likely reveal other 
demand-side factors affecting broadband diffusion.  More research enabling regulators to 
understand the demand-side of telecommunications markets that has long been opaque, is 
indicated.   
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Table 1. Relative OECD Internet Connectivity and Uptake Rankings, 2003 
 
 
 
Source: Howell (2003) p 39. 
 
 
Table 2.  Selected Broadband:Dial-Up Cost Ratios, 2003 
 
 
 
Source: Howell (2003) p 42. 
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